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This study tests the relationship of the 6 ideological variables and 7 contextual
variables to shifts in ideological alignment through a latent class regression analysis for
three periods of years (1972-1978, 1980-1992, 1993-2006). The latent class regression
models determine the number of identifiable classes for each model. Using ideological
realignment theory (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) this study finds there has been a
moderate polarization of opinions that has occurred, as well as, a moderate hardening of
ideological beliefs with moral issues during the third time period becoming the driving
force in ideological makeup. With regard to the culture wars hypothesis (Hunter 1991)
there seems to be so much randomness in peoples overall ideological makeup that it
hardly suggests a salient culture war is taking place. It also seems to matter very little
what opinions individuals express on domain specific issues with regard to political
ideology.

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to the graduate students of the department of sociology
at Mississippi State University without whose friendship and support this project would
have never reached fruition.








ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author expresses his sincere gratitude to the many people who without their
help and expertise this thesis would not have materialized. First and foremost, thanks are
due to Dr. Emory Morrison, for his time, guidance, and patience. Through Dr. Morrison’s
time and effort he has made the author a better scholar and has made this project a better
study. Thanks are also due to Dr. Greg Dunaway and Dr. James Jones. Who have
provided not only valuable insight into this project but also have allowed the author to
become a better scholar inside and outside the classroom.










TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................ iii
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 6

III.

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS ...............................................................11

IV.

METHODOLOGY....................................................................................... 15
Data .................................................................................................... 15
Variables ..............................................................................................17
Statistical analysis................................................................................28

V.

FINDINGS ...................................................................................................31

VI.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION....................................................................49
Future Research ...................................................................................53
Limitations ...........................................................................................54

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................57
APPENDIX
A. PUBLIC OPINION................................................................................................62





B. IDEOLOGICAL REALIGNMENT.......................................................................65





LIST OF TABLES


    

˘ ˇ ˆ˙   ˝

ˆ       

˛

˘° ˇ ˆ˙   ˝ ˝   ˜ ˙  °!
˘ "   ˆ˙  # ˙°
˘˘ "   ˆ˙  ˙°$
˘$ "   ˆ˙  % &˝˙°'
˘' "   ˆ˙  ˙°(
˘( "   ˆ˙   ˜°˛
˘˛ "   ˆ˙    °˛
$ )   
$° # *    ˝ +  ), - .(° .(˛˘
$ # *    ˝ +  ), - .˛! ..°(
$˘ # *    ˝ +  ), - .. °!!'˘
$$ "  ˆˆ ˝  ˝    ˝  ˘'
$' / ˝  ˝   ˜ ˙ˆ˘(







LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 Processes of ideological change ................................................................................... 12





CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This project will look at individuals and the global ideological identity they
possess, their domain specific opinions on public issues, and their socio-demographic
characteristics. An analysis will be conducted of how global ideological identity is a
function of domain specific opinions on public issues and socio-demographic
characteristics. The analysis will show how the process of generating a global
ideological identity has changed from 1972-2006.
According to Sartori (1969 P. 398) discussions about ideology generally fall into
two broad but not mutually exclusive domains, namely “ideology in knowledge and
ideology in politics.” Lakoff (1996) argues that ideology comes from one sense of what is
good in society and from this emerges the antitheses – what is bad or negative in society.
Downs (1957) along the same lines as Lakoff defines ideology as “the verbal image of a
good society and the chief means of constructing such a society” For Karl Mannheim
(1936/1999 p. 49), he believed “ideology was implied to denote that we are skeptical of
the ideas and representations advanced by our opponents.” Mannheim believed that we
do not take ideas and issues at “face value” instead we “interpret those ideas based on
their life-situation (Mannheim 1936/1999 p.49).
Downs (1957, pp 96) provides the most useful definition of political ideology for
this investigation. For Downs, political ideology is not just a belief or a set of beliefs, it
1

is a framework of understanding the world. This framework is rationalized in a set
of logical understandings about the world over the role of government, business morality,
the individual, freedom and equality. These logical understandings about the world create
issue sets that people frame together in a logical fashion to create a coherent worldview.
Thus, In order to understand ideology one must first understand how positions with
respect to component domains (or issue sets) align or cohere to form the ideology.
In the United States there are two competing ideologies that are battling for
supremacy: liberalism and conservatism. These two ideologies have competing positions
with respect to the issue sets that have been established. Liberals are more likely prefer
less government intervention on social issues such as abortion, pornography laws, and
religion, than conservatives. However, conservatives are more likely to prefer less
government intervention in economic affairs than liberals.
These political ideologies evolved as the result of history, culture, and crises that
have occurred, as well as changes in voter attitudes and voter prioritization among certain
issue sets. For example, what was a big issue 30 years ago may not be a big issue today.
How people who fall into these two competing ideologies respond to these changes
constitutes ideological alignment. Ideological alignment can be defined as the bringing
together of separate issue sets into a coherent logical framework in a process that occurs
over time and is responsive to shifts in voter attitudes and voter prioritization of issues.
Over the past several years, many scholars have addressed ideological alignment
in this country (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Schrekhise and Sheilds 2003;
Abramowitz and Knotts 2006). Yet, there has been very little discussion on the evolution
of the two main competing ideologies: liberalism and conservatism. This research project
2

takes the view that ideologies are not stable, fixed constructs but rather very fluid
constructs that evolve and change as societies advance and situations within the society
change. The research project tracks the changes of political ideology from 1972-2006
using the General Social Survey. The main sociological issue being investigated in this
project is how group position and issue sets interact with each other to create ideology
and how ideology changes across certain time periods.
This project is framed within the debate surrounding the existence of a culture
war defined in terms of ideological polarization. Ideological polarization can be defined
as the tendency for individuals to hold extremely divergent views on public issues with
little consensus in the middle ground. The idea of a culture war became popularized by
James Davison Hunter in his book Culture Wars, The Struggle to Define America. What
Hunter (1991) argues is that the culture wars can be seen in certain “wedge issues” that
polarize the public and lead to clashes between competing cultural ideals in this country.
This paper looks at the conceptualization of the culture wars and its role in
shaping the current major ideologies in the United States through a conflict extension
perspective. The conflict extension perspective (Layman & Carsey 2002a, 2002b Layman
et. al. 2006) argues: “attitudes toward social welfare, racial, and cultural issues have
remained distinct and somewhat cross-cutting. However, the parties in the electorate have
grown increasingly polarized on all three of these dimensions” (Layman et al. 2006, pg.
91). While “clear policy difference between the two parties is not new, what is new is
that the parties’ elites, mass coalitions, and activist bases have become sharply divided
along the lines of multiple dimensions within a process termed conflict extension”
(Layman et al. 2006, pg. 104). Layman et al. (2006) argue that neither the party elites nor
3

the mass electorate are likely to have started this process of growing polarization but
instead it was created by the base activists within the two parties. However, Layman et al.
argue that more research needs to be done to find the catalyst for this new conflict among
multiple policy dimensions.
The literature on the culture wars, political polarization, and ideological conflict
extension intersects with the literature on political ideological alignment and realignment.
Ideological alignment (see Appendix B) draws attention to the extent to which (1) social
groups map onto ideas on specific issue sets, (2) ideas on specific issue sets map onto
political ideological identity (e.g. ‘conservatism’ or ‘liberalism’), (3) social groups map
onto political ideological identity, and (4) political party affiliation maps onto ideas on
specific issue sets, social groups, and political ideological identity. The notion of
increased political polarization and conflict extension suggests that these mappings are in
flux. When political polarization occurs, some theorists (Black 1948; Downs 1957) posit
that shifts in alignment occur. Many explain this process within the median voter
theorem. It posits that voters are rational actors who vote along specific policy preference
lines. Voters select candidates based on who shares the closest policy preferences to
them. During times of polarization, politicians are located not in the center of a
hypothetical continuum, but at the poles of the continuum. Thus, the candidate
preferences of the majority of the voting public become in flux and ideological
realignment can happen. The dynamics of how these mappings change substantively
constitutes ideological realignment.
The development of theory about how these dynamics occur is known as
ideological realignment theory. Ideological realignment theory has not been highly
4

developed. There are two main schools of thought as to when and how recent ideological
realignment happened. The first school of thought argues that realignment occurred as a
result of an enlarged voter pool that occurred with the civil rights movement (Carmines
and Stimson 1989). The second school of thought argues that ideological realignment
occurred as a result of the policies and practices of the Reagan administration that
polarized the public and realigned the parties in the US (Abramowitz and Saunders
1998). Ideological realignment theory is subject to debate about what gave rise to
realignment of issue specific ideas, social groups, political parties and political
ideological identity. In this paper, I will form an argument that ideological realignment
consists of a change in the individual level model of the relationships between one’s
social group and one’s ideological identity. I posit that within the U.S., during a prepolarized period, ideological alignment – defined in terms of the intercorrelations
between social groupings, positions on specific idea sets and political ideological identity
– is low and one’s set of opinions is a function of their group position in society and the
concatenate material and social interests. In a later period, ideological alignment is high
because group position determines ideology, which in turn creates issue sets. In other
words the key distinction between the earlier and later periods (model 1 and model 2) is
whether ideology is causally prior or subsequent to the establishment of an interest set.

5

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The foundations for conceptualizing about the process of ideological realignment
are rooted in Downs’ (1957) argument that political parties are first and foremost
interested in holding political office and not promoting an ideal society. Through the
competition and uncertainty of elections this interest pushes parties to develop ideologies
as resources in a struggle for office. In this argument, ideologies are conceived as a
verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing society.
However, functionally, ideology becomes a means to obtaining and consolidating power.
Ideologies help focus voters attention on differences between the parties, which leads to a
rational voter not making a decision based on a single specific policy but on a wide array
of policies. Voters use ideologies as information cost saving devices because they do not
have the time or resources to perform a detailed investigation of the records of the
candidates.
Also, according to Downs (1957), tension and conflict within society creates a
system in which no single ideology becomes dominant because there only so many
constituencies one can appeal to without antagonizing others. Disagreement occurs when
an ideology serves the interest of one constituency while undermining the interest of
another. This conflict between constituencies can lead to changes in political ideology.

6

For the most part, Downs argues ideologies slowly change over time and remain
basically coherent and immobile. Ideological inertia occurs because an ideology cannot
convincingly contradict its past formulation unless some radical changes in conditions
justify this. There becomes a rational relationship between past action and current action,
which leads the latter not to repudiate the former.
Downs’ (1957) basic hypothesis is that competing ideologies tend towards
convergence at a theoretical center. The Downsian convergence hypothesis explains that
the parties, which are the ideological entrepreneurs, will each produce strategies to adjust
their ideologies in an attempt to capture the largest constituencies. This strategy leads to
ideological convergence around the opinion set of members of the electorate positioned
in the center. As these parties move toward the center, or closer to their opponent’s
ideology, the extremes will abstain from voting. Because of the convergence toward the
center, parties become more ambiguous and more rational; however this could make the
voters less rational because distinctions are harder to come by. The more party ideology
adapts to win elections by moving toward the center the more activists and the extremes
in the party want their principles to be placed at the forefront. When party extremists
want their principles placed at the forefront the process leads to an emergence of new
polarizing ideologies. Therefore, the Downsian model of ideological change is, basically,
cyclical.
The Conflict Displacement Perspective focuses attention away from the
Downsian emphasis of ideological position on a latent spectrum, to the variable issues
sets that comprise the core of an ideology. Conflict displacement literature (See
Schattsschieder 1960, Sundquist 1983, Carmines & Stimson 1989, Clubb et al. 1990; and
7

Miller and Schofield 1993) posits party coalitions take place along a single dominant
policy dimension. One of the central points of conflict displacement theory is that old
conflicts tend to get resolved before new conflicts can occur and become exploited by the
major parties. In contrast, the Downsian perspective predicts slow movement toward the
center followed by movement away from the cycles of convergence. Both the Downsian
perspective and the conflict displacement perspective were works that early in the study
of ideological realignment shaped the belief systems and research of others.
The term ideological realignment first emerged in the academic literature in
reference to the move by Southern Whites away from the Democratic Party toward the
Republican Party during the late 1960s. In addition, there has been a move by liberal
Republicans in the North toward the Democratic Party. This movement has provided a
stronger link between party affiliation and ideological identity which has increased the
extent of polarization. This paper will look at this issue and examine these effects on each
party. Some have labeled this perspective the “ideological realignment” argument or
ideological realignment theory (Carmines & Stanley 1990, 1992; Levine et. al. 1997;
Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Fleisher & Bond 2001; Putz 2002, Schreckise and
Shields 2003; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). The ideological realignment
perspective argues that people are increasingly choosing their party based on ideological
orientations (Carmines & Stanley 1990).
Explanations for why this change has occurred include the fundamentalism
polarization affect – that the moral majority movement of the late 1970’s has led to an
increased polarization of public opinion and a decrease in toleration of out groups. For
example, Jelen (1982) argues southern intolerance was based on the impact of
8

fundamentalism in the south. Some have argued against the fundamentalism polarization
effect. Dimaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996) found no effect of faith, operationalized as
religiously conservative affiliation versus religiously liberal affiliation, on political
polarization. Also, Ellison and Musick (1993) tested this hypothesis and found only weak
support for this argument. Ellison and Musick argued that there may be a multitude of
factors to explain this idea of intolerance in the south, such as lack of personal
encounters.
The conflict extension perspective provides a different account for the dynamics
described above (Layman & Carsey 2002a, b Layman et al. 2006). This literature argues
that there has been an increasing polarization not just along one issue strain but among
three issue strains: social welfare, racial, and cultural issues. This perspective
reconceptualizes the conflict displacement perspective in suggesting that ideologies
realign by mechanisms other than jettisoning issues that have been neutralized through a
Downsian convergence process. For example, according to conflict displacement, only
after social welfare issues fall into the background can racial and cultural issues come to
predominate whereas, within the conflict extension perspective all three issues
simultaneously can become operative.
One of the reasons conflict extension could have occurred is through party
strategizing to maximize group solidarity through constructing issue sets that exploit
racial social divisions. For example, many Americans perceive social welfare programs
as primarily benefiting minorities and more specifically blacks. (Peffley, Hurwitz, and
Sniderman 1997; Gilens 1999 Valentino and Sears 2005), also many Americans perceive
a linkage between crime and African-Americans (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997;
9

Kinder and Sanders 1996; Valentino 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino and Sears 2005).
The notion of single parent families within the African-American community made
famous by the Moynihan report (1965) has lead to a linkage between social welfare, race,
and issues of culture. We have seen a linkage between the issues of race, culture, and
social welfare within our American mass media so it may be the case that this linkage has
further promoted conflict extension and polarization (Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman
1997). As a distinct social group –African Americans are linked to a set of social welfare
issues, a set of family issues and a set of social control issues. Political parties seeking to
maximize votes strategize to construct ideologies to exploit this interest set convergence.
The issues surrounding these interest sets become viable wedge issues for building
ideologies to capture constituencies when African Americans are in a position to compete
for status as a group with other groups. Thus, the underlying issue here is group status. In
regions where African Americans have a substantial presence, they compete for status as
a group with other groups, most notably whites with low education. Moreover, given that
African Americans and low education whites have tightly bounded social networks with
few bridging ties, a political party is presented a strategy to maximize votes by
constructing an ideology to promote solidarity within one of these groups and to
symbolically and materially represent the interest of that group. Through representing the
material interests and opinion sets of one group it could set the other group in opposition,
which would further lead to issue set alignment.

10

CHAPTER III
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS

As was noted earlier, conflict extension (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998;
Layman and Carsey 2002a; Layman and Carsey 2002b; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz;
2006) and ideological realignment theory (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) serve as the
theoretical launching point of this paper. The goal of this paper is to extend these
theories. It has been previously argued that conflict extension occurs along the three
dimensions of racial issues, cultural issues, and social welfare issues; this paper will seek
to test an expansion of this argument to include issues of authority/justice (crime),
taxation, and environmental issues. Also, this paper will test how group position, interest
sets, and ideology are related across periods. In the initial period specified in this
analysis – during the 1970s, it is hypothesized that the group position one is located in
will lead to certain interest sets, which will then form an ideology. Later, it is
hypothesized that group position will lead to a certain ideology, which then creates issue
sets. Figure 3.1 depicts these processes.
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Process 1

Process 2

Group
Position

Group
Position

Interest
Sets

Ideology

Ideology

Interest
Sets

Figure 3.1 Processes of ideological change

Table 3.1 describes the empirical implications of these two distinct models. In the
first period, it is hypothesized that the correlation of opinion across component domains
will be low and correlation of opinions with ideology will be low. For example, during
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the earlier period the correlation between race or region with attitudes toward social
welfare policies will not be high, however in the later periods the correlation will
increase. Also for period one, it is hypothesized that latent class regression analysis will
identify many distinct ways in which opinion sets predict ideology. In other words, a
number of unique regression models will be necessary to estimate how commitment to
domain specific beliefs will predict global ideology. For example, a model that heavily
weights the effect of family-cultural issues might best predict ideology for those living in
the south; a model that heavily weights the effect of economic issues might best predict
ideology for those living in the North. In the second period, the correlation of opinion
across component domains with social group membership will be high and correlations of
opinions with ideology will be high. Models that predict ideological identification will be
consistent across social groups.

Table 3.1

Hypotheses regarding change in ideological alignment
Process 1 PreReagan 19721978

Correlation between
component domains
Correlation of
component domains
with ideological
identity
Regression patterns
based on component
domains

Reagan 19801992

Med

Low

Process 2 Post
Reagan 19932006

High

Low

Med

High

Many

Med

Few
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Hypothesis 1: Correlations Between Public Opinion Items Across Component
Domains:
a. Correlation of responses to public opinion items across component
domains during Pre-Reagan will be low.
b.

Correlation of responses to public opinion items across component
domains post-Reagan will be high



Hypothesis 2: Correlations Between Public Opinion Items and Global Ideological
Identification:
a. Correlations between individual public opinion items and global
ideological commitment (liberal/conservative) will be higher post-Reagan
than Pre-Reagan.



Hypothesis 3: In Latent Class Regression Analysis (LCRA):
a. An LCRA will produce fewer distinct latent classes post-Reagan than preReagan.

14

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

Data
Data for this paper come from The General Social Survey (GSS), which is
published by the National Opinion Research Center. The years covered are from 19722006. The data are split into three different time periods 1972 -1978 (Period 1), 19801992 (Period 2), 1993-2006 (Period 3). For Period 1, 10,652 cases were present. Of those
cases, 2,251 fit the specifications for the model in this paper. For Period 2, there were
17,130 total cases and 5,798 that fit the specifications for the models in this analysis. For
Period 3, there were 23,238 total cases in the model and 3,758 cases that fit the
specifications of the model.
The GSS has a total of 5,364 variables for the years 1972-2008. From 1972
through 2006, 51,020 people respondent to the survey questions (each person was
surveyed only once). The GSS was started in 1972 and is a cross sectional study that
looks at public opinion and social change. The GSS completed its 27th round of surveying
in 2008. The GSS is the largest project funded by the sociology program of the National
Science Foundation and except for the US. Census the GSS is the most frequently
analyzed source of data in the United States. For the years 1972-2000, interviews were
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conducted face to face and manually with questionnaires that where coded and key
punched. Since 2002, the GSS switched to computer assisted personal interviewing.
There are no longer printed questionnaires but the showcards are still printed. Interviews
usually last for 90 minutes.
For the years 1972 and 1974, samples followed a modified probability design.
This analysis employed a block quota system. For every year in the survey since 1974, a
full probability sample has been used. In 1982 and 1987, blacks were oversampled by
design. One limitation of the GSS is that for the years 1972-2006 they only sampled the
English speaking population.
For the GSS while there are many questions that are given for all years such as;
age, sex, region, race, and other attitudinal questions, not all questions are given for all
years. The questions given for all years are known as the core. Some questions from the
core were removed in 1994. Despite the fact that the interview is often 90 minutes long
what can be included in the interview is often limited. Also, some questions may not
apply to all members of the survey. Additionally, there are topical modules which are
used on certain topics in one year but then may not be used again for a while. For
example, there is a topical module on social networks in 1985 and it is not seen again
until 2004 (National Opinion Research Center 2010).
The GSS collects basic demographic data on each respondent, including both
gender and race. Race is observed as black, white, and other since black/white
distinctions are of greatest interest for the research conducted. Hispanics may be
undersampled in this survey because from the years 1972-2006 the only people surveyed
were the English speaking population. Some of the questions used to construct the issue
16

set indicies used in analyses reported in this paper were not asked in the same year. Only
years that will be used are those where sufficient questions were asked to construct each
index in the following analyses.

Variables
The dependent variable in this research is political ideology. Respondents to the
General Social Survey were asked do they think of themselves as liberal or conservative
on a 7 point scale: 1. extremely liberal, 2. liberal, 3. slightly liberal, 4. moderate, 5.
slightly conservative, 6. conservative and 7. extremely conservative. Table 2 presents the
distribution of responses to this item by period. For political ideology, more people put
themselves in one of the three conservative categories than the liberal categories
consistently throughout all years in the survey. However, in all periods, moderates
represented the plurality of respondents with roughly 39 percent of the responses. The
middle three categories; slightly liberal, moderate, and slightly conservative make up
over 60 percent of the survey respondents for all periods listed.
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Table 4.1

Distribution of responses by period to the prompt:
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The analysis includes contextual independent variables capturing a basic profile
of the respondent: age, gender, region educational attainment, and income. Age is
measured in terms of years but a small portion of the sample were coded “89 or over”.
Gender was classified simply as male or female. Region was classified into the nine
census divisions: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain and Pacific.
Educational attainment was divided into five categories; 1-less than high school, 2-high
school, 3-some college, 4-bachelor, 5-graduate degree. Income was measured ordinally,
but cut points were scaled to 1970 standards. In some analyses in this paper, race and
religion have been cross classified with region of the US, creating 5 distinct categories of
respondents. These five distinct categories were: 1-blacks, 2-whites from the south who
were fundamentalist, 3-white fundamentalist in general, 4-white other, 5-other. In this
classification, the south combined the regions South Atlantic and East South Central.
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Table 4.2 presents the distribution of scores for these contextual independent
variables for each period. For each period in the survey, women outnumbered men. While
whites, continued to be the largest racial category surveyed, they declined from 87.7
percent of the survey in the years 1972-1978 to 78.9 percent of the survey in 1993-2006.
There was an increase in the survey of those whose racial category is identified as other,
from 0.6 percent in 1972-1978 to 7.2 percent in 1993-2006. Since income was measured
ordinally, based on 1970’s standards there was a large increase from the first period to the
third period in people who made over 25000 dollars going from 8.2 percent in the first
period to over 57 percent in the third period. The largest regions surveyed through all
three relevant periods were the Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, and South Atlantic.
Through all periods, the three regions listed averaged between 14 and 21 percent of the
survey with the South Atlantic being the region with highest growth in the survey going
from 14 percent in the first period to 19 percent in the last. Moderates were the largest
religious group in all periods of this survey. However, both liberal and fundamentalist
religious adherents increased in periods 2 and periods 3 within the survey. For the first
period, religious moderates made up over 50 percent of the survey during the third period
they made up roughly 39 percent. While fundamentalists where higher than liberals in all
years of the survey liberal religious adherents seemed to be the fastest growing religious
group going from 18.8 percent in the first period to nearly 30 percent in the third period.
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Table 4.2

Distribution of scores for contextual co-variates
1972-1978
N
%

1980-1992
N
%

1993-2006
N
%

Sex
Male
Female

4874
5778

45.8
54.2

7333
42.8
9797
57.2
Race
White
9341
87.7
14084
82.2
black
1243
11.7
2571
15.0
Other
68
0.6
475
2.8
Age
18-25
1685
15.9
2334
13.6
26-40
3280
30.9
5940
34.8
41-55
1515
23.9
3636
21.0
56-65
1535
14.5
2198
13.0
Above 65
1456
13.6
2948
17.3
Income
Less than 1000
158
1.5
173
1.0
1000 to 2999
539
5.1
365
2.1
3000 to 3999
489
4.6
459
2.7
4000 to 4999
388
3.6
487
2.8
5000 to 5999
413
3.9
489
2.9
6000 to 6999
395
3.7
437
2.6
7000 to 7999
429
4.0
434
2.5
730
6.9
691
4.0
8000 to 9999
10000to14999
1896
17.8
2099
12.3
15000to19999
1230
11.5
1717
10.0
20000to24999
812
7.6
1784
10.4
25000 ormore
905
8.5
6461
37.7
Highest degree completed
LT High School 3779
35.5
4425
25.8
High School
5209
48.9
8911
52.0
Junior college
195
1.8
728
4.2
Bachelor
977
9.2
2094
12.2
Graduate
437
4.1
921
5.4
Region
New England 504
4.7
864
5.0
Middle
1857
17.4
2559
14.9
Atlantic
East North
2320
21.8
3251
19.0
Central
WestNorthCentral 35
6.9
1454
8.5
20

10232 44.0
13006 56.0
18339 78.9
3219 13.9
1680 7.2
2512
7503
6680
3383
3686

10.8
32.4
29.8
14.6
15.9

260
1.1
245
1.1
208
0.9
221
1.0
282
1.2
286
1.2
288
1.2
520
2.2
1657
7.1
1471
6.3
1700
7.3
13303 57.2
3573
12187
1678
3847
1895

15.4
52.4
7.2
16.6
8.2

1054
3261

4.5
14.0

3941

17.0

1668

7.2

Table 4.2 Continued
South Atlantic
1979
18.6
EastSouth Central 564
5.3
Pacific
1367
12.8
Racefundsouth
Blacks
1243
11.7
White southern
866
8.2
fundamentalists
White
977
9.2
fundamentalists
nonsouth
Other whites
7100
67.2
All others.
194
1.8
Religion
Fundamentalist
3046
29.1
Moderate
5438
52.0
Liberal
1968
18.8

3149
1306
2141

18.4
7.6
12.5

4545
1540
3234

19.6
6.6
13.9

1067
2790

6.2
16.3

1382
3454

5.9
14.9

2571

15.0

3219

13.9

10227
475

59.7
2.8

13503
1680

58.1
7.2

5691
6990
3957

34.2
42.0
23.1

6937
8579
6565

31.4
38.9
29.7

Public opinion issue set variables are constructed from inventories of questions
that cover six domains. These six domains are moral issues, racial issues, social welfare
issues, crime issues, taxation, environmental concerns. Questions used to construct each
scale are identified below. Scales were created by averaging the within year Z-scores for
each of the items within the scale. This method enabled reliable estimates of scales even
when individual items within a scale were missing during that year. All scales were
tested with the reliability coefficient Kronbach’s alpha. All scales had a reliability of over
0.70 .
For sexual morality and family issues, five items composed the scale. The first
item captures whether the respondent agrees that a woman should be able to have an
abortion if the woman wants one for any reason: “yes” or “no”. The next item in the
scale captures responses to whether or not the respondent favored or opposed sex
education in public schools. The third item for this scale captures people’s feelings
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regarding whether divorce laws should be easier or more difficult. The fourth item for
this scale captures level of (dis)approval of homosexual sex collapsed to a two point
scale: ‘never wrong’ and ‘sometimes wrong’ versus ‘always wrong’ and ‘almost always
wrong.’ The fifth item on this scale captures on a three point scale, opinions regarding
restrictions on pornographic materials: from ‘never illegal’ to ‘illegal under 18’ to
‘always illegal.’ Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics for each of these items (prior to
Z-transformations) by period. Three of these items (abortion, sex education, and
homosexual acts) are measured as binary outcomes – and therefore, the reported means in
Table 4.3 represent the proportion of respondents during that period that take a more
conservative stance on the issue. The third item (divorce) and fifth item (pornography)
are measured on a three point scale (0 to 2) with higher scores indicating a more
conservative response.
The most significant change over time with regard to sexual and morality issues
came with regard to homosexual acts. A huge shift of opinion occurred between the first
period and the second period. With the proportion reporting that homosexual acts are
wrong declining from 78 percent to 60 percent between these two time periods. There
was a slight increase in the proportion reporting opposition to homosexual acts between
1993-2006 rising to65 percent of the respondents. Another relevant finding from this
table is while sex education has received broad support from the public even in the first
time period the proportion of opposition has decreased going from 20 percent in the first
period to 12 percent in the third. Respondents in the survey are also declining in their
opposition to abortion from 64 percent of the respondents in the first time period to 57
percent of the respondents in the last time period. For pornography laws there seems to be
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a consistency in the table that remains constant throughout all time periods. This
consistency seems to show that people believe pornography should be illegal to anybody
under 18 for the mean average.

Table 4.3

Items contributing to Moral issues

These items were combined together into a single scale, by first transforming each
valid responses to each item into a within year z-score. Second, z-scores for each item
were averaged together to generate a composite measure. Thus, items with missing
values were not incorporated into the composite measure. The items contributing to this
scale varied across years.
For racial issues there were two items that are represented in this scale. The first item
used captured whether the respondent favored a law against racial intermarriage. The
next item captured whether respondents agreed with the statement ‘blacks shouldn’t push
themselves where they’re not wanted.’ Responses ‘agree strongly’ or ‘agree slightly’
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were collapsed together and responses ‘disagree strongly’ or ‘disagree slightly’ were
similarly collapsed together.
Table 4.4 displays descriptive statistics for each of these items (prior to Ztransformations) by period. Both of these items are measured as binary outcomes – and
therefore, the reported means in Table 5 represent the proportion of respondents during
that period that take a more conservative stance on the issue. The scale for the racial
issues was constructed in much the same way as the moral values scale using Z-scores.
For Table 4.4 below there has been a substantial increase in the number of people
who disagree with the statement blacks shouldn’t push going from 74 percent in the first
period to 40 percent in the third period. This is indicative of larger support from the
public for African Americans being allowed into certain institutions that they may not
have been in the past. Also, there has been a decline in support for laws banning
interracial marriage laws from 50 percent of the respondents in the first time period to 28
percent in the third. On issues of race, it seems there has been larger movement toward
liberal ideology than conservative ideology.
For social welfare issues, five items were used in this scale. The first item
captures people’s opinion on the level of government spending for welfare. The next
item on the captures people’s opinion on the level of government spending on cities. The
third item for this scale looked at government spending on the nation’s education system
and the fourth item for this scale looked at government spending for the nation’s health.
Each of these items are scored on a three points scale from ‘too little,’ to ‘about right,’ to
‘too much.’ The fifth item on this scale asked the question should government reduce
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income differences. This item was based on a seven point scale from ‘government should
reduce income differences’ to ‘no action should be taken by the government to reduce
income differences.’ The Scale for social welfare issues was once again created by
finding the within year Z-scores for each item and then creating composite averages.

Table 4.4

Items contributing to racial issues

For the social welfare scale there was very little change over the periods in the
means and standard deviation for all items in this analysis. There was a large increase in
the number of people who were asked the question ‘should government reduce income
differences’ from the first period to the third period: increasing from 747 respondents to
12,322 respondents. The mean for each of the items listed described that people tended to
believe government was spending too little in the areas of healthcare, cities, and
education. With regard to welfare, the items in Table 4.5 indicate that people believed the
government was spending too much.
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Table 4.5

Items contributing to Social welfare issues

For the crime scale, three items were contained in this measure. The first item
dealt with spending of government on reducing crime: with responses reported as ‘Too
little,’ ‘Too much,’ or ‘About right.’ The second item that was used to create this scale
captured whether the respondent favors or opposes the death penalty for murder. The
final item for this scale captured whether respondents favor or oppose laws restricting
gun ownership. Descriptive statistics for these items are listed in Table 4.6 with higher
scores indicating more conservative opinions.
For Table 4.6 there was very little change in the crime scale mean and standard
deviation over the years. What the analyses show is that the overwhelming majority of
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people favor gun permits and also support the death penalty in all periods of the survey.
Also, most people believe the government spends too little on crime.

Table 4.6

Items contributing to crime issues

The taxation construct consists of only one item from the survey. The GSS asks:
‘are taxes too high, too low, or about right.’ This was coded on a three point scale: ‘too
high,’ ’about right,’ or ‘too low.’ numbered consecutively from 0 to 2. For Table 4.7,
there was a small increase in the number of people thinking there taxes were too high
from the first time period to the third. However, this difference is so modest the change
could be mostly due to sampling error. There was also only one item used for analysis for
the environment as well. This question asked respondent’s opinions on government
spending for the environment. The question was also coded on the same three point scale:
‘too low,’ ’about right,’ or ‘too high.’ For Table 4.8, during all periods of the survey there
was a consistent belief that spending on the environment was too low.
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Table 4.7

Items contributing to taxes

Table 4.8

Items contributing to environment

Statistical analysis
For hypotheses 1 and 2, correlations were run to test the relationship of opinions
across items and with global ideology for all three periods. These correlations constituted
the first stage of the analysis. For hypothesis 3, a series of latent class regression
analyses were estimated for all three periods testing the effects of domain specific
ideological variables on global ideology. These latent class regression analyses
estimates were made iteratively increasing the number of latent classes and/or the number
of constraints in the specified model. A best fit model (i.e. the number of latent classes
and constraints) are selected based on model fit criteria. Once the number of latent
classes is identified, the model will be elaborated to estimate the effect of the contextual
level variables on class assignment.
Latent class regression analysis (LCRA) is an extension of latent class analysis
(LCA). Latent class regression analysis assigns cases to separate classes for application
of statistical test, then through the use of the Bayesian information critieria (BIC) creates
a best fit model for the data. In Latent Class Analysis, cases are assigned to different
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classes as a result of scores that are distributed on a specific set of observed variables.
Through the use of LCA, formal hypotheses for this study were better able to be
evaluated than through other regression models because LCA can identify multiple latent
classes within the sample (Morrison, Rudd, Zumeta, Nerad 2010).
LCA also allows the use of covariates (age, race, region, etc.) to predict
membership in a given class. Using LCRA will extend LCA by estimating the latent
classes as a function of how sets of exogenous variables (here the public opinion
constructs) predict the single dependent variable (political ideology).1 In order to identify
the number of latent classes and set of model constraints that best fits with the data,
alternative models are estimated and compared to one-another using maximum likelihood
estimation. Analysis starts with a simple one class model and a baseline BIC score is
calculated. More complicated models are subsequently specified and their BIC score is
also calculated. Parameter constraints may be used to measure whether estimates are
different across classes.2 The lowest BIC statistic identifies the best fit model among all

1

Using Maximum Likelihood, LCRA simultaneously estimates (1) within each of the latent classes a
coefficient and a t-test statistic for the net effect of each independent variabl on the dependent variable (2) a
Wald test statistic the size and significance of which provides a test of the null hypothesis that the effects of
a given variable on the dependent variable are equal across latent classes; (3) a likelihood test for each case
of membership in each of the latent classes; (4) for each of the covariates modeled, a coefficient and t-test
statistic that tests the hypothesis that the covariate predicts membership in a latent class; (5) a goodness-offit statistic for the model--- the likelihood ratio statistic (l2)---- that reflects the odds of finding the observed
distribution in the data given the model parameter estimates; and (6) explained variance statistics
(r2)capturing how much variance is explained across classes (Magidson and Vermunt 2004; quoted directly
from Morrison et. Al 2010 P. 13)
2

In a LCRA with multiple classes, parameters that estimate the effect of an independent variable on a
dependent variable may be unique for each class. However a parameter may be constrained to be the same
across classes suggesting that for more than one group the effect of x on y is identical---- which therefore
limits the number of parameters to be estimated and thus gains parsimony. This study constrained
parameters to be the same only where parameters where found to have no significant difference. (Morrison
et. Al. p. 13)
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specified models (Raftery 1995) .3 In latent class analysis there are three criteria for
measuring the goodness of fit; the BIC, AIC and CAIC criteria. (Lazarsfeld & Henry
1968). The BIC was chosen as the best fit criteria because it provides the optimum
balance between the number of variables and connection to theoretical implications.

3

The BIC statistic is a function of the model likelihood statistic (how likely we are to observe the data as it
is distributed if the estimated parameters represented the true model) and the number of parameters
estimated in the model. Thus, the BIC statistic balances the parsimony with the model fit. In evaluating
models, the smaller the BIC statistic the more empirical evidence in favor of the model. (Raftery 1995;
quoted directly from Morrison et. Al 2010 p. 13)
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS

Table 10 describes the correlations as described by hypothesis 1 and 2 of this
study. The correlations of opinion items to each other, as well as political ideology were
actually extremely weak in this table. The tax issue had the weakest relationship with
other variables in the model. The two items that were most strongly correlated with
political ideology were moral issues and social welfare issues. Social welfare issues
tended to be stronger during the first period of the study while moral issues became the
strongest correlate during the third period of the study. Social welfare issues and moral
issues are also significantly correlated (at the p<0.01 level) with all other issue set
variables except for crime in 1972-1978. Moral issues are also not significantly correlated
with taxes in 1980-1992. While there are more correlations among opinion items across
component domains post-Reagan vs. Pre-Reagan it is only a slight increase and the
correlations are still relatively weak. For the correlations between the ideology variables
and political beliefs there is relatively little difference pre-Reagan compared to post
Reagan. There is a weak association between domain specific variables and one’s overall
political ideology.
With regard to hypothesis one of this study addressing correlation among public
opinion items across component domains Pre-Reagan and Post Reagan. Correlations for
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public opinion items post Reagan was higher than pre-Reagan. However, the correlations
pre-Reagan on most responses was still significant. While hypothesis 1A in this analysis
is rejected, hypothesis 1B in this analysis still holds true that correlations of public
opinion items are greater post Reagan than pre-Reagan. Hypothesis 2A in this analysis
was rejected because there was no significant difference between correlation of public
opinion items with political ideology post-Reagan as compared to pre-Reagan. Also, the
correlations regarding all items were very weak in these analyses.
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Table 5.1

Correlations
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Table 5.2 describes all 26 latent class models that were estimated for the years
1972-1978. The best fit model was the simplest model, the one-class latent regression
analysis. Table 5.1 reveals that this model obtains the lowest BIC statistic (7100.52)
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among all models for the first period Model 1 was a one class regression including all
public opinion variables.

Table 5.2


Model Fit comparisons for Latent Class Regression Analysis 1972-1978
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Table 5.2 (Continued)





  
° ), 
  
 :˙˝˝  ˘.(. (°˛.°



'.˛$. !°(

˘

° ), 
˝˙ ˙   
  ˘˛(( (°$˘!

'

'.($˘( !°(

ˇ

° ), 
 $:˙˝˝ 
   ˜˙ ˘.. (°˘.˛$

˘

'.˛'(˛ !°



'..(!˛ !°!



(°˛˛'˘ !°!

˘!

'˛˛!( !°˛

 ), 
 .  $!.˘ (!!$°

°

(!!(˛. !

 ),  
 ˜
  ˙ !$ °˘$˛


.

°!''$(

!!

° ), 
 ':˙˝˝ 
˙ ˘.˛$˘ (°$°˘
ˆ
° ), 
 (   
 '$˛( ($$˛$
˙
° ), 
˙  ˜ ˙
ˆ˙
˝˙ ˙  ˘.! (˘'˛
˝
˛









° ), 
 ° !$˛( °!.˛˘

! °!(( !(



 ), 
 ° !°'$ °!.(.$

$


˘

˘ ), 
 ° !°˘˛ °!'$
 ), 
 ˝˙ ˙ 
 $!.˘ (!!$°

35

°!$!$ !$

(° °!˘°.'! !°
°

(!!(˛. !

Table 5.2 (continued)
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Table 5.2 indicates that 20 models that were specified for the years 1980-1992.
The best fit model in this analysis was model 14, a two class regression model with
estimated effects for all issue set variables, and environmental issues, race issues, and tax
issues constrained to be equal sized effects across classes. The effects of all contextual
variables on class were estimated except the effect of race by fundamentalism by region
was set to zero. The BIC criteria for the best fit model (model 14) was 18354.65.
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Table 5.3

Model Fit comparisons for Latent Class Regression Analysis 1980-1992
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Table 5.3 (Continued)
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Table 5.3 (continued)
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Table 5.3 indicates the 23 models that were ran for the years 1993-2006. The best
fit model (model 3) in this analysis was the baseline 1-class regression model. The BIC
criteria for the best fit model was 11960.56.
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Table 5.4


Model Fit comparisons for Latent Class Regression Analysis 1993-2006
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Table 5.4 (Continued)
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Table 5.4 (Continued)
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Table 5.4 (Continued)




° )
, 
 
˝˙
 



 







'° °(˛.$˘

. °˘'° !°˘

 )
,  
:˙˝˝ 
 ˜ '°˛ °(˘'
˝

° °'˘!˛˘ !˛

 )
, 
˝˙ ˙ 
 
 '°˛ °(˘'
˛

° °'°'.˛ !˛



 )
, 
˝˙ $.˘!$. .(...

° ˛˛˛ !˛



° )
, 

 ° $˛'!˛( °!!..

$ (°($ !°˘



Table 5.4 shows the estimated coefficients from the best fit models for the three
periods. For the first period, a one class model was the best fit model. Both moral issues
and social welfare issues are the most significant driving forces during these years. The
effect of opinion vis-à-vis crime is also quite strong. Tax issues and environmental
spending while also significant factors in influencing political ideology had nowhere near
an intense effect as both moral issues and social welfare issues. Once other issues are
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controlled racial issues only have significant effects in the second time period when set to
equal effects.
From 1980-1992 the best fit model was a two class model. Environmental issues,
tax issues, and race issues were all constrained to equal effects across classes for this
model. For class one in this analysis, Moral issues were the strongest driving force in
predicting political ideology. Opinion on spending to improve the environment also had a
relatively strong effect. For class one the total amount of people who fell into this model
were 3878 and it explained almost none of the variance in political ideology (4 percent).
For class two of the 1980-1992 model social welfare issues were the strongest
predictor of political ideology. Moral issues were the second strongest predictor in the
class two model with crime also being a significant predictor of political ideology. For
the 1980-1992 class 2 model, 34 percent of the variance was explained and 1920 people
were found to be in this model. Overall 17 percent of the variance was explained by the
1980-1992 best fit model. For this model, it is not so much that one factor is dominant
but there are four factors that are strongly significant predictors of political ideology.
Thus, those in this class have a more multidimensional pattern underlying their political
belief system.
For the years 1993-2006, the best fit model was a one class regression model.
Moral issues were the strongest predictor in this model and were significantly stronger
than the either the 1980-1992 models or 1972-1978 models. Social welfare issues while
also an extremely significant predictor of political ideology was not as strong as moral
issues. Tax issues also became a significant factor in predictor political ideology after not
being a significant factor in the 1980-1992 models. Overall, the strength of the models in
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1993-2006 seems to indicate a crystallization of ideology, both by the increase in the zscores and by the increase in variance. 3758 people were in the best fit model for 19932006 with a variance of 18 percent.

Table 5.5

Ideological variables best fit models for datasets of each year
1972-1978

Moral Issues
Race Issues
Social
Welfare Issues
Crime Issues

Tax Issues
Environmental
Issues
Explained
Variance
Within classes
Total Explained
variance
N Within Class
N Total

Class 1

Class 1

Class 2

0.23**
(8.50)
0.05
(1.70)
0.27**
(8.47)

0.15***
(6.11)
0.06**
(4.05)
0.07 *
(2.29)

0.31***
(7.90)
0.06**
(4.05)
0.67***
(9.41)

19932006
Class
1
0.31***
(15.64)
0.01
(1.05)
0.29***
(12.19)

0.01
(0.48)

0.32***
(5.84)

0.16***
(7.00)

0.03
(1.69)
0.10***
(5.65)
0.04

0.03
(1.69)
0.10***
(5.65)
0.34

0.09***
(3.60)
0.14***
(6.36)
0.18

0.17**
(5.56)
0.06*
(2.28)
0.01**
(3.54)
0.13

1980-1992

0.13
2251
2251

0.17
3878

0.18
1920

5798

3758
3758

***significant at the .001 level.
**. significant at the 0.01 level.
*. significant at the 0.05 level .
() Z-score

Table 5.5 shows the coefficients for the effects of contextual variables on class
assignments (and the Z test statistics associated with these coefficients) for the 2 class
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regression model from 1980-1992. Coefficients represent the effect on the log odds of
assignment to Class 2 (the class in which opinions on issues matter for overall reported
political ideology) for a one unit increase in the contextual variable. People with less
education were more likely to be in class one of this model than class two. Income was a
significant predictor of Class assignment – the higher one’s income the more likely one is
to be a member of Class 2. Finally, males are also significantly more likely to be in the
Class 2. Overall, the higher one’s status (as measured by income, education, and gender)
the more likely one was to be a member of a class in which preferences on specific issues
were correlated with political ideological identification.

Table 5.6

Best fit model for contextual variables
1980-1992 Class 1
Coefficient
Z value

Race
White

0.00

0.01

Black

0.23

1.14

Other

-0.23

-0.79

Fundamentalist

-0.06

-0.55

Moderate

-0.04

-0.40

Liberal

0.09

0.83

Age

-0.01

-1.52

Fundamentalism

Age
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Table.5.6 (Continued)
1980-1992
Coefficient
Z-Value
Degree
Less than high
school
High School
Junior College
Bachelor
Graduate
Middle atlantic
E. North
Central
W. North
Central
South Atlantic
E. South
Central
West South
Central
Mountain
Pacific

2.03*

2.49

0.84
0.37
-0.54
-2.70
0.35
0.00

1.31
0.57
-0.85
-1.08
1.92
0.03

-0.08

-0.34

-0.27
0.06

-1.70
.24

-0.08

-0.39

-0.13
-0.41

-0.56
-2.37

-0.12*

-2.43

Income
Income
***significant at the .001 level.
**. significant at the 0.01 level.
*. significant at the 0.05 level .
-Class 2 of the 1980-1992 Latent Class Regression model is simply the inverse of class one contextual
variables.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

With regard to hypothesis one of this study addressing correlation among public
opinion items across component domains Pre-Reagan and Post Reagan. Correlations for
public opinion items post Reagan was higher than pre-Reagan. However, the correlations
pre-Reagan on most responses was still significant. While hypothesis 1A in this analysis
is rejected hypothesis 1B in this analysis still holds true that correlations of public
opinion items are greater post Reagan than pre-Reagan. Hypothesis 2A in this analysis
was rejected because there was no significant difference between correlation of public
opinion items with political ideology post-Reagan as compared to pre-Reagan. Also the
correlations regarding all items were very weak in these analyses. For hypothesis 3, the
latent class regression analysis conducted for this research did not produce more latent
classes post Reagan than pre Reagan. For 1972-1978, one latent class was produced.
During the Reagan and George H. W Bush years, there were two latent classes. During
the third period in the survey post-Reagan the number of latent classes moved back to
one. During none of the three periods, do domain specific opinions explain very much of
the variation in self declared political ideology. In short, it seems to matter very little
what opinions individuals express on domain specific issues, with regard to their self
declared political ideology. When people say they are ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ in the
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context of a public opinion survey, they seem to be revealing very little about how
they will respond to a domain specific question. We are left with a question of what it
does mean when some self declares (in the context of a public opinion survey) that they
are ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative.’
With regard to the culture wars argument portrayed by Hunter (1991) there is so
much randomness in patterns of responses it hardly suggests a salient culture war
amongst the general public. Opinions that one would presume to divide the public into
competing camps are correlated at extremely modest levels.
The analysis seems to follow the conclusion of Abramowitz and Saunders (1998)
and Layman and Carsey (2002a; 2002b; and 2006) of there being an ideological
realignment that occurred during the Reagan years and quickly this realignment became
more partisan, which led to the increase in significance in the public opinion variables.
While it can be said that liberals and conservatives may look at issues differently it seems
like the mechanisms involved in making ideological decisions are the similar.
The examination of the GSS through LCRA does also support Layman and
Carsey (2002) contention that the mass response to elite level development should be
limited to particularly strong partisans and strong party identifiers. The groups who
identify themselves as strongly liberal or strongly conservative do not fit well into any
classes within the models indicated. From the conclusion of the LCRA the masses create
their view of ideology separate from that of the strong ideological identifiers.
This analysis does take contention with ideological realignment in some areas.
For one there does not seem to be mass ideological change that is occurring. The classes
observed in these models did not change in ideological make up or identity, the classes
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just modestly increased in the alignment of their beliefs. The findings suggest that while
extension may be occurring there is not a mass ideological shift that is occurring. Further
research through longitudinal studies may be helpful in furthering these findings or
challenging these findings. This analysis was based on cross sectional data so a strong
definitive finding cannot be concluded, but the findings do indicate there has been a very
modest increase in polarization: people who answer on the extreme ends of the
ideological spectrum as increasing modestly over time (see Table 2). Additionally
correlations between issues sets do increase over time but this increase is very modest.
However, there seems to be no evidence of a strong realignment within political
ideology.
The analysis from this research indicates that issue sets play a weak (albeit
modestly gaining in strength) role in the alignment of ideologies in all years in the data.
Eighty-two to eighty seven percent of the variation in self-declared ideology remains
after accounting for domain specific opinions that presumably constitute each respective
ideology. While this paper does not make the claim that contextual or group position
variables are not important this analysis indicates that ideological variables are dominant
in determining ones ideology. If anything, these variables distinguish (during period 2)
whether domain specific opinions matter at all. It seems from period 2 that higher status
individuals in education and income are more aligned than lower status individuals. Also
the article incorporates other issues that seem to have effects on political ideology such as
the environment and crime issues, which furthers the conflict extension hypothesis into
new areas. The analysis conducted in this project is consistent with Abramowitz and
Saunders (1998) contention that the Reagan years created more partisanship but only a
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modest increase in partisanship. However, the reasons behind this may need more
scrutiny through further research. Also, the analysis found that classes tended to derive
from the center. Extreme liberals and extreme conservatives seem to form their
ideological components different from those who consider themselves moderate. More
analysis should be conducted to see how people who consider themselves on the
extremes of the two ideologies form ideological opinions.
One major importance of this study is that contrary to past studies on the subject
of ideology instead of using party id as the dependent variable this study uses political
ideology. While the parties have tended to be bound by one ideological unit today in the
past you had liberal Republicans in the northeast and conservative Democrats in the south
and still have conservative Democrats in the south today, although not as frequent. This
analysis is different than many past studies on political ideology because we look
specifically at the political ideology variable and do not incorporate party identification
into our analysis. This analyses did not ask about the effects of contextual variables on
political ideology, instead this analyses asked how opinions are correlated with ideology
thus contextual variables are not as strong in this analyses as past analyses
Moral issues are, in the 1993-2006 period, the driving force in self identification
of political ideology. It seems that the effects of moral issues are more pronounced in
later periods rather than earlier periods. In the earlier periods social welfare issues were
equal to and in class 2 of the 1980-1992 model greater then moral issues in determining
political ideology. This indicates not only more focus on moral issues in later years of the
study, but a higher focus in moral issues among the higher educated as well. Class 2, in
the 1980-1992 period, are more multidimensional in their decisions on ideology based on
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issue sets. In the last period of the one class model for 1993-2006 seems to indicate that
the lesser educated have become more aligned with their political ideology. If people
with lower education had not increased in alignment they would have remained as a
separate class distinct from those with higher education as in the second period. For
people with lower education issue sets would explain only very little variation. However,
as was shown in Table 14 only one class is prevalent. Also there seems to be a moderate
crystallization of meanings about what conservatism and liberalism have become.
Therefore, issue sets have become more salient in predicting one’s ideological viewpoint
but only modestly more important.

Future Research
Future research should also look at other surveys such as the National Election
Survey (NES) to see if patterns indicated in this analysis hold. While the National
Election Survey has been used frequently in realignment research, to this author’s
knowledge a LCRA has never been conducted with regards to ideological realignment.
While this analyses did look at the relationship between age, religion, and race. Future
analyses that include more recent elections may want to look at generational trends based
on age, race, and income. Also, while this analysis focused heavily on blacks and whites
due to data limitations, future analyses must include the growing Hispanic demographic
and its effects on shifting ideological paradigms. Future research should also look at the
Americans for Democratic Action ratings and American Conservative Union ratings to
further investigate the convergence or divergence between the elite’s from each
ideological perspective vs. the masses. In other words, do the elites move the masses or
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do the masses move the elites. Future research must also further investigate issues with
crime. Due to limitations on the GSS questions could not be asked about drug
legalization and stiffer penalties for certain crimes such as drug abuse, rape, molestation,
murder, and many others. Future research must also address crime issues more
thoroughly. While this article makes the claim that more polarization is occurring it
seems that with regard to crime there is congruence or coming together of liberals and
conservatives. However, this could be an artifact of the data with not enough questions to
create an adequate scale.
Future research must also investigate the role of political engagement in
contributing to ones ideology. With the weak association of issue sets and ideology one
potential explanation could be the political engagement of the participants in the survey.
Adding a variable political engagement, which could not be done with this study would
greatly expand our understanding of the creation and maintenance of political ideologies.
Also, there should possibly be more fieldwork and qualitative research done in the area of
ideological realignment to gain a richer understanding of the mechanisms incorporated in
an individual’s creation of ideology.

Limitations
While this study advances the framework on political ideology into new
dimensions there was also some limitations. The most prevalent limitation was from the
data. Some variables that could have been included in this analysis such as; defense
spending, beliefs on homosexual marriage, or many other issues could not be included in
the study due to the volume of missing variables or variables that were not present during
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all years of the study. Also because of limitations in the classes this study failed to
measure adequately how the extremes in both ideologies come to their global component
domains. Another limitation from this study is that while we found that moral issues are
the driving factor in political ideology this could simply be a measurement issue. The
scales that where created could have been a better fit for moral issues.
Despite the limitations of this paper, the analysis provides modest support in
furtherance of the ideological realignment. This article also indicates that there was some
polarization that occurred during and right after the Reagan presidency that intensified
this effect. This analysis has also expanded the conflict extension perspective to
investigate environmental issues and crime issues as possible elements of creating an
ideological opinion. The analysis seems to indicate that ones self reported ideology only
has a weak association with issue-sets.
There is also much to be said about the importance of this literature in not only
sociology but also political science. The research conducted for this article may shed
some light on new types of conflicts that are emerging with relation to political ideology.
The evidence indicated in this survey show that family and sexual morality issues are a
driving force in the identification of one’s political ideology at least in the last years of
the survey. What this research indicates is that sexual morality and family issues plays a
modest yet stronger than other issue sets role in the decisions of those who tend to
consider themselves moderates and not just the extremes of each ideology. This has
profound consequences for our understanding of these issues. Moral issues are not
driving the extremes of each ideology as much as they are driving moderate forces. This
could explain the rise of Republican dominance during this era. The focus Republicans
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gave to moral issues such as the 2004 marriage amendment and many other issues over
the last 30 years may have been a beneficial link to explain the rise of conservative
dominance politically in the US.
Another important point sociologically to make from this literature is that with
growing polarization may lead to a new form of segregation in which we as Americans
segregate ourselves on the basis of political ideology (Bishop and Cushing 2009; Kaus
1995). The effects of political polarization is not just a political issue but a social issue in
as much as new forms of conflict and segregation emerge, which must be explained by
future research into this subject

56

REFERENCES

Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. 1998. Ideological Realignment in the U.S.
Electorate. The Journal of Politics. 60: 634-652
Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2005. “Governor’s Plan to
Redraw the Political Map: Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive
Elections.” San Francisco Chronicle, February 10, B-9.
Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2006. Don’t Blame
Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections. Political Science and Politics 39:87-90
Abramowitz Alan, and H. Gibbs Knotts. 2006. Ideological Realignment in the American
Electorate: A Comparison of Northern and Southern White Voters in the PreReagan, Reagan, and Post-Reagan Eras. Politics and Policy. 34: 2006
Abramowitz Alan, and Kyle Saunders 2005. Why Can’t we All Just Get Along? The
reality of a Polarized America. Forum: 32: 200-234
Anderson, Kristi 1979, The Creation of A Democratic Majority 1928-1936. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Bartels, Larry 2000. Partisanship and Voting Behavior 1952-1996. American Journal of
Political Science. 44: 35-50.
Beck, Paul A. 1976. “Youth and the Politics of Realignment” In Political Opinion and
Behavior ed. E. C. Dreyer and W. A. Rosenbaum. Belmont CA: Wadsworth
Publishing
Bishop, Bill and Robert Cushing 2009. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded
America is Tearing us Apart: New York: Mariner Books
Black, Duncan (1948). "On the rationale of group decision-making". Journal of Political
Economy 56: 23–34.
Black, Earl and Merle Black 2002. The Rise of Southern Republicans. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press
Burnham, Walter D 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics.
New York: W.W. Norton
57

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. The
American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Campbell, James E. 1985. Sources of the New Deal Realignment: The Contributions of
Conversions and mobilization to partisan change. Western Political Science
Quarterly 38:357-376
Carmines, EG. Stanley, HW. 1990. Ideological Realignment in the conservative south:
Where have all the Conservatives Gone? In The Disappearing South? Studies in
regional change and Continuity. Ed. RP. Steed, LW Moreland, TA Baker. Pp. 2133 Tuscaloosa Al: University of Alabama Press.
Carmines, EG. Stanley, HW.1992. The Transformation of the New Deal Party System:
Social Groups, Political Ideology, and Changing Partisanship Among Northern
Whites, 1972-1988. Political Behavior 14_213-237
Clancey, W. J. 2005. Folk theory of the social mind: Policies, principles, and
Foundational metaphors. Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society. Available online and CD-ROM.
Clubb, Jerome M., William H. Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale. 1990. Partisan
Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the
Transformation of American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Davis, James Allan and Smith, Tom W. General social surveys, 1972-2008[machinereadable data file] /Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and CoPrincipal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V.
Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago:
National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009.
Dimaggio, Paul; John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. Have Americans’ Social
Attitudes Become more Polarized? American Journal of Sociology. 102:690-755
Erikson, Robert S. and Kent L Tedin. 2007. American Public Opinion: Its origins,
Content and Impact. New York: Pearson Longman.
Ellison, Christopher G, and Marc Musick. 1993. Southern Intolerance: A fundamentalist
Effect. Social Forces 72: 379-398
Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2006. Culture War the Myth of A
polarized America. New York: Pearson Education
58

Fleisher, R, Bond JR. 2001. Evidence of Increasing Polarization among Ordinary
Citizens. American Political Parties: Decline or Resurgence? In Cohen JE.
Fleisher R. Kantor P. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press
Downs Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row
Gilens, Martin 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Green, John C., Lyman A Kellstedt, Corwin E Smidt and James L Guth. 2003. The Soul
of the South: Religion and Southern Politics at the Millenium. In The New Politics
of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics. 2nd edition Ed. Charles S.
Bullock and Mark Rozell. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield pp. 283-298
Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York:
Basic Books.
Jelen, Ted G. 1982. Sources of Political Intolerance: the case of the American South. Pp.
73-91 In Contemporary Southern Political Attitudes and Behavior, edited by
Laurence W. Moreland Tod A. Baker and Robert Steed. Praeger
Kaus, Mickey 1992. The End of Equality. New York: Basic Books
Key, V. O. 1955. A Theory of Critical Elections. Journal of Politics 17: 3-18
Key, V. O. 1959. Secular Realignment and the Party System Journal of Politics 21: 198210
Kinder, Donald and Lynn Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and
Democratic ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago press
Ladd, Everett C. and Charles Hadley. 1978. Transformations of the American Party
System 2nd edition. New York: W. W. Norton
Lakoff 1996. Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don’t. University
of Chicago press: Chicago
Layman, GC, Thomas Carsey 2002a. Party Polarization and Conflict Extension in the
American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science: 46:786-802
Layman, GC, Thomas Carsey 2002b. Party Polarization and Party Structuring of Policy
Attitudes: A comparison of Three NES Panel Studies. Political Behavior 24: 199236

59

Layman, GC, Thomas Carsey, Julianna Horowitz 2006. Party Polarization in
American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences. Annual Review of
Political Science 9:83-110
Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Henry, N. W. (1968). Latent Structure Analysis. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Levine J, Carmines EG, Huckfeldt R. 1997. The Rise of Ideology in the Post New Deal
Party System, 1972-1992. Am. Political Quarterly. 25:19-34.
Mayhew, David R. 2002 Electoral Realignments, A critique of An American Genre. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Mannheim, Karl 1936/1999 Ideology and Utopia. Routledge: New York.
Mendelberg, Tali 2001. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the
Norm of Equality. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Miller, G, Schofield N. 2003. Activists and Partisan realignment in the United States.
American Political Science Review. 97:245-260
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. 1965 The Negro Family: The case for National Action
Washington D.C.: Office of Policy Planning and Research US. Department of
Labor
National Opinion Research Center 2010. About GSS. Retrieved from
http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/GSS+Website/About+GSS/
Peffley, Mark, Jon Hurwitz, and Paul Sniderman. 1997. Racial Stereotypes and Whites
Political views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime. American journal
of Political Science 41:30-60
Petrocik, John R. 1987. Realignment: New Party Coalitions and the Nationalization of
the South. Journal of Politics. 49:347-375
Putz, D. W. 2002. Partisan Conversion in the 1990’s: Ideological Realignment meets
measurement theory . Journal of Politics 64:1199-1209
Sartori, Giovanni 1969. Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems. American Political
Science Review 63: 398-411
Schattschneider, EE. 1960 The Semisovereign People: A realist’s view of Democracy in
America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden
Schrekhise, William and Todd Shields 2003. Ideological Realignment in the
Contemporary U.S. Electorate Revisited. Social Science Quarterly 84: 596-612
60

Sears, David O. and Jack Citrin. 1985. Tax Revolt: Something for nothing in California.
Expanded Edition Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of
Political Parties in the United States. Rev. ed. Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution.
Valentino, Nicholas, A. 1999. Crime News and the Priming of Racial Attitudes during
Evaluations of the President. Public Opinion Quarterly 63: 293-320
Valentino, Nicholas, and David Sears. 2005. Old Times There are Not Forgotten: Race
and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South. American Journal of
Political Science. 49: 672-688
Valentino, Nicholas Vincent Hutchings, and Ismail White. 2002. Cues that Matter: How
Political Ads prime racial attitudes during Campaigns. American Political
Science Review. 96:75-90
Yeric, L. Jerry, and John R. Todd. 1996. Public Opinion: The Visible Politics.
Itasca,Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers.

61

APPENDIX A
PUBLIC OPINION

62

PUBLIC OPINION
This project is designed to investigate how ideologies change, as well as
investigate how the likelihood and the extent of constituents adherence to ideology
changes. In order to consider how an ideology changes one must first consider what an
ideology consists of. Empirically, an ideology can be observed as the coherence of views
on a divergent set of public opinion issues. Thus in order to provide a full context for
understanding how political parties polarize and how ideological realignment occurs it is
important to provide a full context and definition to exactly what public opinion is.
Erikson and Tedin (2007 P. 7) define public opinion by focusing on each component
word. Thus they state “the public is a group that has something in common.” Similarly
Yeric and Todd (1996 P. 5) define the public as a collection of individuals who share a
common attitude. Yeric and Todd break the public into three different types; the single
issue public which is composed of persons who share a common concern over one
particular issue, the organizational public is formed because some members belong to
some special interest organization, and the ideological public, which is distinctive
because of its adherence to an ideology. Erikson and Tedin (2007) look at who makes up
the public and conclude that the public is a broad based general concept including
anybody 18 and over with the right to vote.
In defining opinion one must first understand that it is “the verbal expression of
an attitude” (Erikson and Tedin 2007 P. 7). “Attitudes are also latent they cannot be
directly observed” (Erikson and Tedin 2007 P. 7). Attitudes tend to remain stable for
extended periods of time so for one to examine change in public opinion one must first
look at what attitudes have changed within society and then describe and explain the
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cause and effect relationship that led to the change. It is also important to differentiate
between attitudes and tastes. If one is polled on what type of music they prefer that is not
a public opinion that is a taste. It is also important to note that what type of music one
prefers is going to never be resolved therefore this is what distinguishes tastes from
beliefs (Erikson and Tedin 2007).
It is also important to distinguish beliefs from opinions, “disagreements about
questions of facts are not opinions but beliefs” (Erikson and Tedin 2007 P. 7). With
beliefs, perhaps one day through science, there may be a way to end the argument and
find, which side is right, whereas with opinions the debate theoretically could continue
without end (Erikson and Tedin 2007).
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IDEOLOGICAL REALIGNMENT
In the American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) partisan identification was a
significant factor in vote choice. According to the views presented in the American Voter
partisanship is handed down from parent to child and creates and shapes the way that
people view the world. Partisanship and ideology according to this view become part of
the socialization process of children, creating an early representation of the morals and
values that will guide a person’s politics throughout their life. Some have also argued that
political ideologies create a general notion of what is a perfect society or utopia (Lakoff
1996). Political ideologies unify certain stances into a larger theoretical framework in
order to create a notion of what a perfect society would look like according the
ideology’s philosophy. The utopia that is envisioned is based on the moral system of the
ideology and the economic system of the ideology. One notion that must be understood in
addressing ideology is that, for the most part, ideology is a radial category – a category
“not definable by properties that all members of the group possess” – especially with
regard to the ideologies of liberalism and conservatism in the United States (Clancey
2005, P. 2). Thus an ideology becomes defined by a set of components that cluster
together but are imperfectly correlated.
Ladd and Hadley (1978) argue that ideological realignment happens in response
to changes in the social or economic environment. The fundamental argument here
consistent with Downs (1957) is that change in ideology is normally slow and stable, but
can be abrupt due to an economic, political, or international crisis. One such crises that
Ladd and Hadley invoke is the Great Depression, which created an opening for
Democrats to gain power for a large majority of the time from 1930 till 1980. A second
66

such crisis was the emergent 1960’s social movements, which represented a generational
and cultural shift that caused a realignment of southern whites to the Republican Party
and African Americans to the Democratic Party. Others similarly make arguments that
alignment is relatively stable but does change during crisis. (Key 1955, 1959, Burnham
1970; Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale 1980; Sundquist 1983) Also, many scholars have
argued that realignments occur because of newly enfranchised voters, which enlarge the
voter pool (Anderson 1979; Beck 1976; Campbell 1985; Carmines and Stimson 1989;
Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). A further purported precipitator of realignment is that
long term single party power monopoly causes policy innovations by contending parties
that may contribute to a changing ideology (Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale 1980). 4
Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) look at ideological realignment in the US
electorate and through NES Panel data in 1976-1978 and 1992-1994. What they find is
that during the Reagan years there was a move toward increased polarization, which in
turn made it easier for citizens to distinguish between the two separate party ideologies.
The authors disagree with Carmine and Stimson (1989) who argues that realignment
happened as a result of the civil rights movement, which occurred during the 1960’s and
4

Many of the arguments above make the claim that ideological dominance has a
cyclical pattern with one ideology dominant for a certain period of time while another
ideology is emergent during times of economic, political or moral crisis. Mayhew (2002)
argues “none of the claims of the realignments genre holds up well” (P 69). He argues by
analyzing the elections of 1820 all the way up to 1992 that party identification does not
seem to succeed any better as a cyclical motor for ideological realignment than do tension
and boiling points.
Mayhew continues to argue that classical realignment does not only involve
cyclical patterns but also periodicity, and party systems. Through analyzing these three
notions with ideological realignment concludes that “the realignments way of thinking
adds little or no illumination but it does exact opportunity costs. Other lines of
investigation could be more promising” (P. 165). In the end, Mayhew makes an argument
for abandoning the terminology all together.
67

created a new wave of voters and began the decline of the Democratic Party in the south.
As blacks began to gain more power whites began to feel threatened and solidified their
issue sets, which consolidated around conservative Republican ideal’s, whereas newly
enfranchised blacks began to consolidate ideologically around liberal Democratic ideas.
Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) argue that this ideological realignment occurred not
because of one issue but of a whole host of issues in which people became more
polarized. This is the very beginning of what would later be categorized conflict
extension.
Valentino and Sears (2005) argue that racial attitudes precipitated new forms of
ideological alignment. Through an examination of the National Election Study from 1980
to 2000 they find that polarization has occurred because racial attitudes in the south have
spilled over into other domestic policy issues that what would be considered as race
neutral. Considerable evidence has been given that racial attitudes have spilled over into
issues such as welfare (Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman 1997; Gilens 1999 Valentino and
Sears 2005), crime (Peffley Hurwitz and Sniderman 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996;
Valentino 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino and Sears 2005), taxes and spending (Sears
and Citrin 1985; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002, Valentino and Sears 2005), and
moral issues (Layman and Carsey 2002a, 2002b, Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006).
Bartels (2000) continue the analysis of voting behavior by using the National
Election study and finds conclusions similar to Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) in that
partisan voting decreased from 1964-1976 however it began increasing from 1978-1996.
Partisan voting can be defined as the tendency of Democratic voters to vote Democratic
in all races and similarly Republican voter’s tendency to vote for Republican candidates
68

in all races on the ticket. Schreckhise and Shields (2003) revisit ideological realignment
based on Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) analysis and find that the “empirical evidence
presented supports the argument of the ideological realignment theory, with some
clarifications, we find evidence suggesting a secular ideological realignment toward the
republican party among southern white males based largely on ideological factors. We
also find evidence of an ideological realignment among non-southern white women based
on both ideology and the transmission of parental partisanship.” (P. 606). The authors
argue that this alignment occurred for southern whites based on the “southern strategy”
which was launched during the Nixon years in order to get more whites in the south to
vote for the Republican Party. However, the authors say that a “rigorous theoretical and
empirical examination is beyond the scope of this investigation.” They do present
evidence that issues related to race may be the driving force among ideological
realignment among southern white male voters” (P. 606) one of the goals of this paper is
to further investigate this realignment through empirical analysis for further results of the
influencing factors of southern white male ideological realignment.
While racial issues are predominant in the literature to explain southern
realignment among whites. There is other literature such as Black and Black (2002) and
Petrocik (1987), which explain realignment based social class. The basic argument is that
as the south began to industrialize more people were moving into elevated social classes
which caused the shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Also some
argue (Green et al. 2003) that the shift in ideological alignment occurred based on
religion. With the south having more evangelical and fundamentalists than other sections
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of the country the emphasizing of issues such as abortion and gay rights by Conservatives
caused a shift away from the Democratic Party and toward Republicans.
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